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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") appeals from
a final judgment of the Third District Court suspending Joseph P. Barrett from the
practice of law in Utah for violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Constitution
article VIII, section 4, which provides that, "the Supreme Court by rule shall govern
the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court err in ordering a suspension, rather than disbarment,

for an attorney found to have engaged in intentional misappropriation of firm funds?
This issue was preserved through closing argument and through the
Sanctions Hearing Brief submitted to the District Court. [R. 399)
STAND ARD OF REVIEW

While this Court will ordinarily presume the district court's findings to be
correct, it "reserves the right to draw inferences from basic facts which may differ
from the inferences drawn by the lower tribunal." In re Jardine, 2012 UT 67 1J 26.
The standard of review for sanctions imposed for ·· pr.ofessional misconduct in
attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the Utah Supreme Court
may make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline
if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997).
I

DETERMINATIVE LAW

The following rules are fully set forth in the Addendum to Brief of
Appellant, submitted herewith:
Rule 14-601

Definitions; Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Rule 14-602

Purpose and Nature of Sanctions

Rule 14-603

Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Rule 14-605

Imposition of Sanctions

Rule 14-607

Aggravation and Mitigation

Rule 8.4

Rules of Professional Conduct (with comments)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case. The district

court suspended Mr. Barrett for a period of 150 days for violating rule 8.4(c) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct in three separate matters.

The OPC appeals the

district court's decision and urges the Court, pursuant to its inherent authority to
govern the practice of law, to impose the more appropriate sanction of disbarment.
The Course of Proceedings:

The OPC filed a Complaint against Mr.

Barrett pursuant to a directive of a screening panel of the Utah Supreme Court's
Ethics and Discipline Committee. [R. 1] On January 27 , 2015, the district court
presided over an adjudication trial to determine whether Mr. Barrett violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"). [R. 321] On February 11, 2015, the court
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issues its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, finding that Mr. Barrett violated
rule 8.4(c) of the Rules. (R. 365) Accordingly, a sanctions hearing was held on
March 2, 2015.

[R. 426]

On March 3, 2015, the court entered its order

suspending Mr. Barrett for 150 days. [R. 429] The OPC filed its Notice of Appeal
on March 5, 2015. [R. 484]
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Mr. Barrett was employed at the firm of Snow, Christensen and Martineau
("the Firm") from 2003 until February 2012. [R. 366]
Williams' Matter:
In July 2007, the Firm and Mr. Barrett were hired by Dick Williams to
represent Mr. Williams' son in a criminal matter.
$1 ,000 retainer to the firm.

(R. 367) Mr. Williams paid a

The criminal matter was closed in December 2007

without Mr. Barrett billing any time against the retainer.

(R. 367)

In 2008, Mr.

Williams asked Mr. Barrett to assist him in a collections matter for his company,
Dick's Backhoe and Sewer.

Between April 2008 and September 2008, three

charges totaling $460 where charged to Mr. Williams' account, but not billed
against the retainer at that time. (R. 367) In the summer of 2008, Mr. Williams
performed construction work at Mr. Barrett's personal residence.

(R. 367)

In

August and September of 2008, Mr. Barrett requested all of the charges on Mr.
Williams' account to be written off by the Firm. (R. 367)
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In February 2010, Mr. Williams' son was charged in several new criminal
matters. (R. 367) Mr. Williams contacted Mr. Barrett about representing him, and
Mr. Barrett entered his appearance in the cases. (R. 368) Mr. Williams retained
the Firm to represent his son. (R. 369) In March 2010, Mr. Williams paid $300 to
the Firm. (R. 368)

At some point, Mr. Williams and Mr. Barrett reached an

agreement whereby Mr. Barrett would provide legal services to Mr. Williams' son in
exchange for construction work performed by Mr. Williams at Mr. Barrett's personal
residence. (R. 369) The Firm was unaware of the agreement. (R. 369) Between
March 2010 and July 2010, Mr. Barrett billed $7,665 to Mr. Williams' account.
Around June or July 2010, Mr. Williams provided construction services to Mr.
Barrett at his personal residence in the form of a wrought iron railing . (R. 368)
Between June 14 and June 25, Mr. Barrett requested that the firm write off a total of
$7,446.57 in fees, costs, and interest from Mr. Williams' account. (R. 368)
Mr. Williams was unable to compete the railing project at Mr. Barrett's home.
(R. 368) The value of the construction services provided by Mr. Williams up to that
point did not equal the value of the legal services provided by Mr. Barrett. (R. 369)
So, on July 21, 2010, Mr. Williams, or his wife, wrote a check for $3,500 made out
to Mr. Barrett personally, which represented the difference between the value of the
legal services and the value of the construction work.

(R. 370)

Mr. Barrett

deposited the check into his personal account. (R. 368) The Firm was unaware
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that Mr. Williams paid $3,500 directly to Mr. Barrett for legal services. (R. 368) In
2011, Mr. Barrett billed $400 to Mr. Williams' account, which was billed against the
$1,000 retainer that had been paid in 2007. In April 2012, after Mr. Barrett left the
Firm, the Firm refunded the remaining $600 of the retainer.

(R. 368).

Of the

$8 ,612.07 billed to Mr. Williams' account, he only paid the Firm $700. Mr. Barrett
requested that the remaining $7,912.07 be written off. (R. 369)
Petersen Matter:
Mr. Petersen was an owner of D& T Landscaping ("D&T").

Between 2006

and 2009, D&T provided various landscaping services to Mr. Barrett at his personal
residence, for which Mr. Barrett paid the company. (R. 370) In November 2010,
Mr. Petersen retained the Firm and Mr. Barrett to represent him in a custody
modification matter. (R. 370) Mr. Barrett and Mr. Petersen reached an agreement
whereby Mr. Barrett would provide legal services in exchange for Mr. Petersen
building a shed at Mr. Barrett's personal residence.

(R. 372) The Firm was

unaware of the agreement between Mr. Barrett and Mr. Petersen. (R. ·373) On
November 2, 2010, Mr. Petersen paid a $2,500 retainer to the Firm. (R. 370) Mr.
Barrett and Mr. Petersen had an agreement that Mr. Petersen would pay the
$2,500 up front, but Mr. . Barrett would have the Firm refund it later.

(R. 372)

Between November 2010 and August 2011, the Firm billed $8,801.10 in fees, costs
and interest to Mr. Petersen 's account. (R. 370) Mr. Petersen received regular
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bills from the Firm but did not pay them because Mr. Barrett told him not to worry
about them. (R. 373) Mr. Barrett concluded Mr. Petersen's custody case on or
about July 20, 2011, and Mr. Petersen began construction on Mr. Barrett's shed on
August 9, 2011. (R. 371) On August 25, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested that the Firm
write off approximately half of Mr. Petersen's bill.

(R. 371)

On September 20,

2011 , Mr. Barrett requested that the Firm write off half the remaining balance on
Mr. Petersen 's bill. (R. 371) On November 22, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested that the
Firm write off the remaining balance on Mr. Petersen's bill. (R. 371) In total, Mr.
Barrett requested that the Firm write off $8,913.54 in fees, costs and interest from
Mr. Petersen's account.

(R. 371)

Mr. Petersen finished Mr. Barrett's shed by

December 2011, and on December 13, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested that the Firm
refund the $2,500 retainer, which it did. (R. 371) Mr. Petersen did not pay the Firm
for any of the legal services provided. (R. 371) Mr. Barrett paid approximately
$5,000 for the shed , which cost Mr. Petersen $15,170.63 to build. (R. 373)
In February 2012, after the Firm became concerned about Mr. Barrett
seeking reimbursement for questionable business expenses, Mr. Barrett was
confronted by the Firm and his employment with the Firm ended. (R. 373)
Based on the above facts, the trial court concluded that Mr. Barrett violated
rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by misappropriating $3,500 of firm

6

funds in the Williams matter, and by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and
deceit in both the Williams and Petersen matters. 1
ADDENDUM
The following documents are attached as Addenda to this Brief:
•

Findings of Fact ar:id Conclusions of Law, and Order.

•

Order of Suspension.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Intentional misappropriation is indefensible, regardless of whether the victim

is a client of the attorney's or the partners in his firm. Stealing is no less wrong ,
simply because it does not involve client funds.
Mr. Barrett intentionally stole firm funds when he reached secret agreements
with clients of the Firm to provide legal services in exchange for construction work
to be performed by the clients at his personal residence.
The same standard this Court applies to the intentional misappropriation of
client funds should be applied to the intentional misappropriation of firm funds.
Disbarment should be the presumptive sanction, regardless of the victim.

1

The trial court also found that Mr. Barrett violated rule 8.4(c) by engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty and deceit in another matter related to
reimbursement for business expenses (the "California Matter"), but because the
Williams and Petersen matters warrant disbarment on their own, it is not
necessary to brief issues related to this third charge of misconduct.
7

In the present case, the mitigating factors are not truly compelling, and
therefore, do not justify a departure from the presumptive sanction.
ARGUMENT

I.

Stealing From One's Firm Is No Different Than Stealing From A
Client.

Although this Court has not addressed the issue of an attorney stealing
from his or her own firm, other jurisdictions have. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey stated:
We see no ethical distinction between a lawyer who for
personal gain willfully defrauds a client and one who for the
same untoward purpose defrauds his or her partners.
In the Matter of Siegel, 627 A.2d. 156, 159 (N.J. 1993)
In Siegel , the attorney was disbarred after submitting false expense reports to
his firm and withdrawing firm funds claiming it was a gift from the client. The
Siegel court went on to explain the rationale for placing theft from a firm on the
same level as theft from a client:
[A]lthough the relationship between lawyers and clients differs
from that between partners, misappropriation from the latter is as
wrong as from the former. A plainly-wrong act is not immunized
because the victims are one's partners.
(lg.)

In, In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Yajko, 674 N.E. 2d 684, 687 (Ohio
1997), an attorney was disbarred after accepting payments from clients but only
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depositing a portion of the funds into the firm's trust account, then keeping the
balance and preparing false receipts and altering accounting records. The Ohio
court adopted the following principle:
It should matter little whether the theft or misappropriation is
from an attorney's partners, associates, clients, family or
friend; or whether the thefts were committed brazenly or
deceptively, or whether tens of thousands of dollars or a
relatively small amount was misappropriated.
Other courts have also concluded that stealing from a firm is no different
than stealing from a client. See, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v.
Nothstein, 480 A.2d. 807 (Md. 1984); In re Salinger, 88 A.D.2d 133 (N.Y.S.2d
1982); In re Seldon, 728 P.2d 1036 (Wash. 1986).
This Court should hold that an attorney engages in misappropriation when
he takes money that belongs to his firm or partners. This Court should further
hold that an attorney engages in misappropriation when, without the knowledge
of his firm or partners, he personally accepts services or property from a client in
exchange for legal services performed by the firm for the client.
In this case, Mr. Barrett engaged in misappropriation when he accepted
$3,500 from Mr. Williams that belonged to the Firm and deposited it into his
personal account.

He further engag.ed in misappropriation when he provided

legal services for Mr. Williams and Mr. Petersen in exchange for construction
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work at his personal residence. It was the Firm, not Mr. Barrett, that was entitled
to the value of the work performed by Mr. Williams and Mr. Petersen.
II.

Mr. Barrett Intentionally Misappropriated Firm Funds.

Rule 14-601 (e) defines "intent" as, "the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result." The evidence found by the trial court establishes
that Mr. Barrett engaged in an intentional and calculated plan to misappropriate
funds belonging to the Firm.
When Mr. Williams retained Mr. Barrett to represent his son, Mr. Barrett
tracked the work performed on the case, which resulted in bills being generated by
the Firm. (See, Trial Exhibit #11 - Open Invoice, attached hereto as Exhibit 1) The
trial court found that, in total, Mr. Barrett billed $8,612.07 to Mr. Williams' account.
(R. 369). However, Mr. Williams only paid $700 to the Firm because Mr. Barrett
caused the remaining $7,912.07 to be written-off.

As a member of a firm

committee dealing with such policies, Mr. Barrett was aware of the Firm's
requirement that write-offs exceeding $4,000 be approved by the Firm's Executive
Committee. (R. 375) Therefore, rather than write-off Mr. William's entire bill all at
once, Mr. Barrett requested separate, smaller write-offs over several months, thus
avoiding any firm oversight that would expose his plan. This conduct evidences a
conscious objective to keep for himself the value of the construction work
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performed by Mr. Williams in exchange for the legal services provided by the Firm
through Mr. Barrett.
Mr. Barrett engaged in the same scheme with regard to the legal services
provided to Mr. Petersen. Although Mr. Barrett's work generated $8,801.10 in fees,
costs, and interest billed to Mr. Petersen's account, which in turn resulted in
monthly bills sent to the client, the Firm did not receive any payments from Mr.
Petersen. That is because Mr. Barrett, again avoiding the threshold limit that would
trigger any review by the Firm's Executive Committee, wrote-off Mr. Petersen's bill
over a period of several months.

(R. 371)

Then, when the shed was finally

completed in Mr. Barrett's backyard, he requested that the Firm refund the $2,500
retainer Mr. Petersen had originally paid to the Firm. Again, this conduct evidences
a conscious objective to keep for himself the value of the construction work
performed by Mr. Petersen in exchange for the legal services provided by the Firm .
Additionally, when Mr. Williams gave a $3,500 check to Mr. Barrett to make
up the difference between the value of the legal services and the construction work,
Mr. Barrett intentionally concealed that fact from the Firm and deposited the money
into his personal account.
The trial court found that Mr. Barrett entered into agreements with both Mr.
Williams and Mr. Petersen to exchange legal services for construction work and
that the agreements were entered without the Firm's knowledge or consent. The
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trial court further found that the Firm was entitled to the value of the construction
work performed by both clients at Mr. Barrett's personal residence. The evidence
clearly established that Mr. Barrett had an intent to keep for himself the value of
payments which rightfully belonged to his Firm and to conceal that fact from the
Firm. This Court should conclude that Mr. Barrett's conduct amounts to intentional
misappropriation.
Ill.

Disbarment Is The Presumptive Sanction For Misappropriation.
Pursuant to rule 14-605(a) of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Sanctions, disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or
another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or
potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal
system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference
with a legal proceedings; or
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary
element of which includes intentional interference with the
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation,
fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft, or the sale,
distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or
solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
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Misappropriation can fall into any of these three broad categories. Even
without a criminal conviction for misappropriation under paragraph (a)(2),
misappropriating firm funds will still warrant disbarment under paragraphs (a)(1)
or (a)(3).
In the case of In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881, 885 (2001 ), this Court found
that disbarment was appropriate under both paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(3)
because misappropriation is conduct involving dishonesty that seriously reflects
on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. This Court has been unequivocal in its
declarations that, "an intentional act of misappropriation of a client's funds is an
act that merits disbarment." In the Matter of the Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 217 (Utah
1997).

The OPC respectfully asks the Court to hold that intentional

misappropriation of firm funds is an act that likewise merits disbarment.
Mr. Barrett's conduct clearly satisfies the elements of 14-605(a)(1 ).

He

knowingly engaged in the misconduct when he entered into the agreements with
the Firm 's clients to trade legal services for construction work.

Mr. Barrett's

intent was to benefit himself inasmuch as the construction work was performed at
his personal residence. The Firm was injured by Mr. Barrett's conduct because
he, not the Firm, received the benefit of the wrought iron railing and the shed in
his back yard. Additionally, Mr. Barrett, not the Firm, received the $3,500 paid by
Mr. Williams for the legal services performed on his behalf.
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The misconduct also satisfies the elements of 14-605(a)(3). Entering into
the secret agreements with the Firm's clients was intentional misconduct that
involved dishonesty and deceit. And stealing money, whether from a client or a
firm , is something that seri ously adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to
practice law.
Whether under 14-605(a)(1 ), (a)(2) or (a)(3), Mr. Barrett's misconduct
warrants the sanction of disbarment. An attorney who is willing to deceive his
partners and keep for himself property which belongs to his firm is one who has
"demonstrated by [his] conduct that [he] is unable or unlikely to be unable to
discharge

properly

[his]

professional

responsibilities ."

(Rule

14-602(b),

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions)
In the present case, the trial court appears to have reached its conclusion
that suspension was an appropriate sanction because this Court's prior holdings
only dealt with misappropriation of client funds. In fact, the trial court stated , "the
court does not find that client funds were taken and that disbarment is not
mandated in this case. " (R. 430)
This Court should hold that intentional misappropriation , from anyone,
merits disbarment. As stated above, "it should matter little whether the theft or
misappropriation is from an attorney's partners, associates, clients, family or
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friends." 2 "A plainly-wrong act is not immunized because the victims are one's
partners."3
IV.

There Is No Mitigation That Would Justify A Departure From The
Sanction of Disbarment.
In cases involving the intentional misappropriation of client funds , this

Court has held that, "a downward departure from the presumptive sanction of
disbarment is appropriate only when a lawyer demonstrates truly compelling
mitigating circumstances." In the Matter of Grimes, 2012 UT 87 ,I 15. The same
standard should apply to all cases of intentional misappropriation, regardless of
the victim.

In the present case, the mitigating circumstances are not truly

compelling and do not justify a downward departure from disbarment. The trial
court found the following mitigating factors: absence of prior record ; restitution
and efforts to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved ; cooperation
with the OPC throughout the proceedings; and "a partial understanding of actions
[Mr. Barrett] should have taken with his firm to avoid the problems. " (R. 430)
With regard to aggravating circumstances, the trial court found: dishonest
or selfish motive; multiple offenses; and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of the misconduct. (R . 430)

2

In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Yajko, 674 N.E. 2d 684, 687 (Ohio 1997).

3

In the Matter of Siegel, 627 A.2d. 156, 159 (N.J . 1993).
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When weighed against the aggravating factors, there is nothing truly
compelling about the mitigating circumstances that would warrant a departure
from the presumptive sanction. There is nothing remarkable about Mr. Barrett's
absence of a prior record of discipline or his cooperation with the OPC, and they
do not ameliorate the theft of funds belonging to his partners.
While the trial court did not elaborate on its finding that Mr. Barrett had, "a
partial understanding of actions he should have taken with his firm to avoid the
problems," it is likely this factor is related to the California Matter. In that matter,
Mr. Barrett sought reimbursement from the Firm for a meal he claimed was for
business development.

(R. 374)

However, Mr. Barrett was not actually in

attendance at the meal. Rather, it was Mr. Barrett's wife and a friend of hers who
had lunch together in California, and Mr. Barrett only spoke to his wife's friend
over the phone about a legal issue. At trial, Mr. Barrett acknowledged he could
have provided more information to the Firm, and the trial court found that Mr.
Barrett "withheld information that would allow the Firm to properly evaluate
whether the expense was legitimate."

(R. 377)

It is not likely the trial court

intended this mitigating factor to apply to Mr. Barrett's agreements to exchange
legal services for construction work because Mr. Barrett has denied that any
such agreements existed . Regardless , having a partial understanding of what
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could have been done differently is not a truly compelling mitigating factor when
the misconduct involves stealing funds.
The trial court's finding

of, "restitution

and efforts to rectify the

consequences of the misconduct involved," is likewise not a truly compelling
circumstance.

After Mr. Barrett's employment with the Firm was terminated

following a confrontation regarding his reimbursement practices, Mr. Barrett and
the Firm reached an agreement. The Firm agreed to not seek repayment from
Mr. Barrett for the funds it believed were improperly reimbursed, and Mr. Barrett
agreed to waive his claim that his partnership shares be repurchased by the
Firm. (See Settlement Agreement, Trial Exhibit 66, not attached hereto)
To the extent the agreement between Mr. Barrett and the Firm could be
considered "restitution," it is not the type of restitution that would mitigate the
offense. This Court addressed a similar situation in In the Matter of the Discipline
of Lundgren , 2015 UT 58 ~22:
It is true that Mr. Lundgren ultimately restored Ms. Best's
funds, but this factor is not mitigating where there is no
evidence to show that remorse was his motivation for restoring
the funds. Tellingly, Mr. Lundgren did not self-report his
unethical conduct or restore the funds to Ms. Best until after
she had lodged a complaint with the OPC. Thus, it seems
likely that his restoration of the funds was merely-a·n. attempt to
avoid punishment. Under rule 14-607(c)(1) of the Supreme
Court Rules of Professional Practice, "compelled restitution"
cannot be considered a mitigating factor.
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Similarly, Mr. Barrett did not self-report his misconduct, which is consistent
with his denial of the existence of any agreement to trade legal services for the
construction work. Therefore, any restitution that might have occurred is not a
mitigating factor that warrants a departure from the presumptive sanction of
disbarment.
In sum, none of the mitigating factors found by the trial court are truly
compelling and this Court should impose the presumptive sanction of disbarment
for Mr. Barrett's intentional misappropriation of firm funds.
CONCLUSION

Intentional misappropriation is an act that warrants disbarment, regardless
of whether the victim is a client or a partner. Mr. Barrett engaged in intentional
misappropriation when he accepted the $3,500 check from Mr. Williams and
when he entered into secret agreements with Mr. Williams and Mr. Petersen to
trade legal services for construction work at his personal residence. Disbarment
is the presumptive sanction for such misconduct and there are no truly
compelling mitigating factors that would justify a departure from the presumptive
level of discipline.

Therefore, this Court should exercise its inherent authority

and disbar Mr. Barrett from the practice of law in Utah.
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________

Dated: January 7th, 2015.

....__ PROFESSIONAL:--CONDUCT
OFFICE OF
~

\

Todd Wahlquist'i
Deputy Senior Counsel
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Discipline of:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER

JOSEPH P. BARRETT #8088
CASE NO. 130907818
Re3pondent.
Judge Robert P. Fau,t

This matter came before the Court on January 27, 2015, for an Adjudication Trial pursuant to
Rule 14-51 l(e) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD").

The Utah State Ba.r' s

Office of Professional Conduct was represented by Todd Wahlquist, Deputy Senior Counsel, and
Respondent, Joseph P. Barrett, was represented by-counsel, George M. Haley and J. Andrew Sjoblom, of
Holland and Hart. Prior to trial, both counsel stipulated to undisputed facts which a.re set forth below.
Further, having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby makes the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.

STIPULATED FACTS
I.

Joseph P. Barrett, who is an attorney in the State of Utah and a member of the Utah State

Bar, is charged with unprofessional conduct. The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct in its
Amended Complaint brought three counts of violation of Rule 8.4(c) - Misconduct. Count I - Williams
Matter, Count II- Petersen matter and Count Ill - California Matter. Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

BARRETT DISCIPLINE

2.
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According to the records of the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar, Joseph P.

Barrett's address is in Salt Lake City, Utah 84103. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Rule 1451 l(b) of the RLDD, in that, at all relevant times, Respondent resided in Salt Lake County and the alleged
misconduct originated in Salt Lake County. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to RuJe 14511 (a), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (amended January 1, 2003) ("RLDD").
3.

The Complaint was brought pursuant to a directive of a Screening Panel of the Ethics and

Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, and is based upon an Informal Complaint submitted by
Andrew Morse against Joseph P. Barrett.
4.

On February 15, 2013, the OPC sent Mr. Barrett an Amended Notice of Informal

Complaint ("NOIC").

5.

On September 5, 2013, a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the

Utah Supreme Court ("the Screening Panel") hea:rd the matter.
6.

At the conclusion of the hearing on September 5, 2013, the Screening Panel directed the

OPC to file a formal complaint against Mr. Barrett.
7.

Joseph Barrett was employed at the firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau ("the Firm")

from 2003 until February 2012.

WILLIAMS MA TIER
STIPULATED FACTS
8.

Richard Williams is the owner of Dick's Backhoe and Sewer Connection.

9.

In June 2007, Mr. Williams' son was charged in a criminal matter.

10.

On June 15, 2007, Mr. Barrett appeared in the criminal matter.
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On July 30, 2007, Mr. Williams paid a $1,000.00 retainer that was deposited into the

Firm's trust account under the name Dick's Backhoe and Sewer.
12.

This criminal matter was closed in December 2007.

13.

Mr. Barrett did not bill any time against the retainer in this first criminal matter in 2007.

14.

In 2008, Mr. Williams asked Mr. Barrett to assist him in a collections matter for his

company.
15.

A small amount of work was performed by Mr. Barrett on behalf of Dick's Backhoe and

16.

On April 3, 2008, $175 in legal fees were charged to Mr. Williams' account.

17.

On August 1, 2008, Mr. Barrett requested the $175 charge to be written-off Mr.

Sewer.

Williams' bill.
18.

On August 7, 2008, $60 in legal fees (without interest) were charged to Mr. Williams.

19.

On August 29, 2008, Mr. Barrett requested the $60 charge to be written-off Mr.

Williams' bill.
20.

In the summer of 2008, Mr. Williams performed construction work at Mr. Barrett's

personal residence.
21.

On September 5, 2008, $225 in legal fees were charged to Mr. Williams.

22.

On September 5, 2008, Mr. Barrett requested the $225 charge to be written-off Mr.

Williams' bill.
23.

In Februl!I)' 2010, Mr. Williams' son was charged in several new criminal matters,

including a felony.
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24.

Mr. Williams contacted Mr. Barrett about representing his son again.

25.

In March 201 0, Mr. Barrett filed appearances in the criminal matters.

26.

Between March 2010 and July 2010, Mr. Barrett billed $7,665 to Mr. Williams' account

27.

In March 2010, Mr. Williams paid $300 to the finn by credit card.

28.

In or around June or July 2010, Mr. Williams provided construction services to Mr.

Barrett at his personal residence in the fonn of a wrought iron railing.
29.

Between June 14 and June 25, Mrr Barrett requested a total of $7,446.57 in fees, costs,

and interest to be written-off Mr. Williams' bill.
30.

Mr. Williams was not able to complete the railing project.

3 I.

On July 21, 2010, Mr. or Mrs. Williams wrote a check for $3,500 made out to Mr. Barrett

personally.
32.

Mr. Barrett deposited the $3,500 into his personal account.

33.

The Firm was unaware that Mr. Williams paid $3,500 directly to Mr. Barrett for legal

services.
34.

Between June 3, 2011 and August 3, 2011, Mr. Barrett billed $400 in legal fees to Mr.

Williams' account.
35.

On December 27, 2011, $400 was billed against the $1,000 retainer that had been

deposited in 2007.
36.

On April 26, 2012, after Mr. Barrett left the Firm, the Firm refunded $600 to Mr.

Williams, representing the balance of the trust account.

BARRETT DISCIPLINE

37.

PAGES

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Of the $8,612.07 in total fees, costs and interest billed to Mr. Williams, he only paid $700

to the firm, and the remaining $7,912.07 was written-off.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT FROM TRIAL
38.

Mr. Williams retained the Firm through Mr. Barrett to represent his son.

39.

The Court, after hearing the testimony of Mr. Barrett, does not give much weight to the

same, Mr. Barrett testified the railing installed at his house by Mr. Williams was a gift and he wrote-off
the retainer and bills to help Mr. Williams, in contrast to the testimony of Mr. Williams, who clearly and
without hesitation admitted he traded the iron work at the home of Mr. Barrett in exchange for the legal
fees relating to his son's criminal matter. Mr. Williams further tes~ified he was the one who suggested the
trade. Further, Mr. Williams testified since the railing was not completed, he determined how much he
had personally already paid out in costs on the railing work to third parties and then determined how
much he owed Mr. Barrett for the balance of the legal work for his son and sent a check of SJ,5000 for
the difference to Mr. Barrett. Mr. Williams also testified the person working on the railing was not his
brother-in-law, which is contrary to Mr. Barrett's testimony.
40.

Mr. Barrett and Mr. Williams reached an agreement whereby Mr. Barrett would provide

legal services in exchange for construction services performed by Mr. Williams at Mr. Barrett's personal
residence. Mr. Williams testified this agreement was an oral agreement and nothing was in writing
between he and Mr. Barrett.
41.

The Firm was unaware of the agreement between Mr. Barrett and Mr. Williams.

42.

The value of the construction services did not equal the value of the legal services.
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Mr. Williams, or his wife on his behalf, directly paid Mr. Barrett $3,500 which Mr.

Williams testified was the difference between the value of the legal services and the value of the
construction services since they were not equal amounts.
44.

The $3,500 paid by Mr. Williams to Mr. Barrett belonged to the Firm.

45.

Of the $8,612.07 in total fees, costs and interest billed to Mr. Williams, he only paid $700

to the firm, and the remaining $7,912.07 was written-off by Mr. Barrett and thus by Mr. Banett's firm.
46.

The Firm was entitled to the value of the construction services perfonned by Mr.

Williams at Mr. Barrett's personal residence.

PETERSEN MATIER
STIPULATED FACTS
47.

Dave Petersen is one of the owners ofD&T Landscaping.

48.

Between 2006 and 2009, D&T provided various landscaping services to Mr. Barrett at his

personal residence.
49.

Mr. Barrett paid D&T for these landscaping services.

50.

In November 2010, Mr. Petersen retained Mr. Barrett and the Finn to represent him in a

custody modification matter.

5I.

On November 2, 20 I 0, Mr. Petersen paid a $2,500 retainer to the Firm that was deposited

into the Firm's trust account.
52.

Initially, it was anticipated that a shed would be built for approximately $5,000.

53.

Between November 2010 and August 2011 , the Firm billed $8,801.10 in fees, costs and

interest to Mr. Petersen's account.
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54.

Mr. Petersen received regular bills from the Finn.

55.

Mr. Petersen's modification case was concluded on or about July 20,'2011.

56.

On or about August 9, 2011, Mr. Petersen or D&T started construction on the shed at Mr.

Barrett's personal residence.
57.

On August 25, 2011, Mr. Barren requested the accounting department at the Firm to

write-off approximately half of Mr. Petersen's bill.
58.

On September 20, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested the accounting department at the Firm to

write-off half of the remaining balance on Mr. Petersen's bill.

59.

On November 22, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested the accounting department at the firm to

write-off the remaining balance on Mr. Petersen's bill.
60.

In the end, Mr. Barrett requested to be written-off a total of $8,913.54 in legal fees, costs

and interest on Mr. Petersen's account.
61.

Mr. Petersen finished most of the construction on Mr. Barrett's shed by December 2011.

62.

On or about December 13, 201 I, Mr. Barren requested the accounting department to

refund the $2,500 retainer paid by Mr. Petersen.
63.

The Finn refunded the $2,500 lo Mr. Petersen.

64.

On December 14, 2011, Mr. Barrett wrote a letter to Mr. Petersen stating that the Finn

had provided $10,577.25 in legal services to Mr. Petersen.

65.

Mr. Petersen did not pay the Finn for any of the legal services provided.

66.

In February 2012 Mr. Barrett's employment with the Finn ended.

67.

ln April 2012, Mr. Barrett made two payments to D&T for the shed totaling $3,030.
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In addition, in November 2011, Mr. Barrett paid $758 directly to the company that

painted the shed, and in September 2011 paid $ I ,204 to Home Depot for doors and windows for the shed.
69.

For the shed, Mr. Barrett paid approximately $5,000.
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT FROM TRIAL

70.

Mr. Barrett and Mr. Petersen reached an agreement whereby Mr. Barrett would provide

legal services to Mr. Petersen for his custody matter in exchange for a shed to be constructed by Mr.
Petersen at Mr. Barrett's personal residence.
71 .

Mr. Petersen testified there was an oral agreement, not a written agreement between Mr.

Barrett and himself to build the shed in exchange for Mr. Barrett's legal work. Mr. Petersen testified this
agreement was made before the work on the shed began. Mr. Petersen testified his first estimate for the
shed was $5,000 as a starting point and they would go :from there. Mr. Petersen testified it was not a flat
rate contract.
72.

Mr. Petersen testified the agreement with Mr. Barrett included his paying a $2,500.00

retainer up :front and he would get the $2,500.00 at the end of their agreement The Court finds the
testimony of Mr. Barrett that he refunded the $2,500.00 retainer because Mr. Petersen wanted to visit his
son in Hawaii and he had no money misleading, and an attempt to explain the refund of the retainer to Mr.
Petersen without admitting there was an agreement in advance to return the '$2,500 retainer to Mr.
Petersen. Mr. Petersen did not testify as to what reason he gave or what was stated to Mr. Barrett when
he got his retainer back, other than the refund of the $2,500 was part of their agreement. Despite Mr.
Petersen not so testifying, he very well may have needed his retainer money to fund his travel to Hawaii
to see his son and may have indicated the same to Mr. Barrett. Thus, the Court cannot definitively
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determine Mr. Barrett falsely testified to the Court that Mr. Petersen asked for a retainer refund and the
reason why he needed the money. The Court, however, finds the return of the retainer funds was not for
the reason stated by Mr. Barrett, i.e. he was attempting to help Mr. Petersen, but rather was a return of

Mr. Petersen's funds as they had agreed.
73.

Mr. Petersen received regular bills from the Firm, but did not pay them because Mr.

Barrett told him not to worry about them. Mr. Petersen testified he was going to talce care of the bills and
costs at D&T and Mr. Barrett would take care of the bills incurred by him.
74.

On December 14, 2011, Mr. Barrett wrote a letter to Mr. Petersen stating that the Firm

had provided SI0,577.25 in legal services lo

Mr. Petersen. Mr. Barrett stated he had been asked to

provide this Jetter by Mr. Petersen and he did not know the reason why Mr. Peterson needed the letter.
However, Mr. Petersen testified he was surprised to get this letter from Mr. Barrett.
75.

In constructing the shed, Mr. Petersen incurred approximately $8,700 in time and labor

76.

In February 2012, after being confronted by the Finn regarding other accounting issues,

costs.

Mr. Barrett's employment with the Finn ended.
77.

For the shed, which has an asserted value or cost of approximately $23,700,

Mr. Barrett

paid approximately SS,000. Mr. Petersen testified he would have reduced the January 2, 2012 invoice by
Sl,000.00 and the rest of the invoice is correct. Sec. Exhibit 38 pp. 7-8. Mr. Petersen testified the actual
cost of the shed, without the costs paid by Mr. Barrett himself is $ I 5, 170.63 as reflected on Ex. 38 p. 6.
78.

The Finn was unaware of the agreement between Mr. Barrett and Mr. Petersen to trade

legal services for a shed.
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The Finn was entitled to the value of the construction services perfonned by Mr. Petersen

at Mr. Barrett's personal residence equal to the value of the legal services provided by the Finn to Mr.
Petersen.

CALIFORNIA MATIER
STIPULATED FACTS
80.

On January 25, 2012, Mr. Barrett submitted an expense report seeking reimbursement

from the Firm for $123.54 for a meal that he olaimed was for business development
81.

The receipt attached to the expense report showed that the meal was at a restaurant in Los

Angeles, California, on January 5, 2012.
82.

The meal was charged to the credit card of Mr. Barrett's wife.

83.

The Firm reimbursed Mr. Barrett for the cost of the meal.

84.

The court docket shows that Mr. Barrett appeared in person in Wasatch County Justice

Court at a pretrial conference on January 5, 2012.
85.

Mr. Barrett's billing records show that he billed for 6.5 hours of work on January 5, 2012,

and there are no references to a meeting or phone call with anyone in Los Angeles that day.
86.

The lunch guest never retained the Finn.

ADDmONAL FINDINGS OF FACT FROM 1RIAL
87.

Mr. Barrett testified he discussed a legal issue with his wife's lunch guest over the phone

and no evidence to the contrary was provided.
88.

The manner in which Mr. Barrett sought reimbursement was deceptive in that the

information provided to the Finn gave no indication that Mr. Barrett was not actually at the lunch meeting

•
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and was contrary, according to the testimony of Mr. Morris, to the informal understanding among the
members of the Finn that a face-to-face meeting with a client was needed in order to be a legitimate
business development cost which would be paid by the finn.

General Facts
89.

The Policy at the firm from 2005 to 201 I required amounts above $4,000 which the

partners wanted to write-off or write-down required Executive Committee approval. See Exhibit 58, Bates
485. Mr. Barrett was a member of a committee at the Finn which would have given him knowledge of
the threshold amount and Mr. Barrett was aware of a threshold amount. It was admitted by Mr. Morris,
President of the Firm, this policy threshold level was not enforced and in January 2012 a new policy went
into effect.
90.

Mr. Morris further testified there was no oversight by the Finn on costs and business

development costs and it was the honor system that was in place amongst the attorneys.
91.

Mr. Morris testified it was the business expense reimbursement request form admitted as

Ex. 56 page 236 which caused concern and led to further review of Mr. Barrett's cost requests. The
concerns included the fact most of the dates on the request form were on a weekend and Item 3 was for
skiing at Soldier Hollow, with the "entertained" or person with whom business development was done
had Mr. Barrett's wife's family name of"Roegiers".

Mr. Morris testified a further review by him and

the Finn was done into the expenses and cost reimbursement request submitted by Mr. Barrett. This
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review led to the discovery of the infonnation and issues of the California Meal reimbursement which
became Count III of the complaint against Mr. Barrett.
92.

Mr. Morris testified all legal services perfonned by the attorneys at the Finn, belong to

the Finn according to their employee contracts. No attorneys are allowed to do legal work outside the
Finn.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court concludes as a matter of law that Mr. Barrett violated the following rules:

WTI.,LIAMS MATIER
93.

Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states:

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
94.

Mr. Barrett engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit when he accepted

payment directly from the client without the Firm'. s knowledge, thereby misappropriating $3,500 in legal
fees that belonged to the Firm.
95.

Mr. Barrett further engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit when he wrote•

off bills that were due to the Finn in exchange for receiving construction services from Mr. Williams at
bis personal residence without the Firm's knowledge.
96.

By engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit, Mr. Barrett violated Rule 8.4(c).

97.

Mr. Barrett's violation of the rule with regard to the Williams matter was intentional and

done with the intent to personally benefit himself. Mr. Barrett's conduct resulted in harm to the Firm and
the profession.

•
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PETERSEN MATTER
98.

Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states:

lt is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
99.

Mr. Barrett engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit when he wrote-off bills

that were due to the Finn in exchange for a shed constructed by Mr. Petersen at his personal residence
without the Finn's knowledge.
JOO.

By engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit, Mr. Barrett violated Rule 8.4(c).

101.

Mr. Barrett's violation of the rule with regard to the Petersen matter was intentional and

done with the intent to personally benefit himself.
102.

Mr. Barrett's conduct resulted in harm to the Finn and the profession.
CALIFORNIA MATfER

103.

Ruic 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states:

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
104.

Mr. Barrett engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit by seeking

reimbursement for client development expenses for a meal in Los Angeles when, in fact, he was in Utah
on that day attending to other matters.

Mr. Barrett withheld infonnotion that would allow the Finn to

properly evaluate whether the expense was legitimate. By engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and
deceit, Mr. Barrett violated Rule 8.4(c).
I 05.

Mr. Barrett's conduct was intentional and done with the intent to benefit himself.

106.

Mr. Barrett's conduct resulted in harm to the Finn.

BARRETT DISCIPLINE

PAGE 14

FINDlNGS & CONCLUSIONS

ORDER
Because the Court finds that Mr. Barrett has violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the Court shall conduct a sanctions hearing. That hearing is set for March 3, 2015, at 1:00 p.m.
to 2:00 p.rn., in Courtroom N41.
Entered this I Ith da.y ofFebruary, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed/emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Order, to the following, this I Ith day ofFebruary, 2015:
Todd Wahlquist
Deputy Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
opcfiling@utahbar.org

George M. Haley
J. Andrew Sjoblom
Attorneys for Respondent
222 S. Main Street, Suite 2200

Salt Lake City, Utah 84 l 0 I
GMHaley@hollandhart.com

JASjoblom@hollandhart.com
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RECE\VED

FILED DISTRICT COURT

Third Judicial District

MARO 5 20l5
Oliice oi Protessional Conduct

MAR O3 2015
s;.u..r LAKE cou~
8Y:-------~:::--~~.,..
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Discipline of:

ORDER OF SUSPENSION

JOSEPH P. BARRETT #8088

CASE NO. 130907818

Respondent.
Judge Robert P. Faust

This matter came before the Court on March 2, 2015, for a Sanctions Hearing. The Office of
Professional Conduct ("OPC") was represented by Todd Wahlquist. The Respondent, Joseph Barrett,
was represented by George M. Haley. Testimony· was given by various witnesses. The Court having
considered the evidence, testimony, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented, finds and
concludes as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On February l l, 2015, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
fin ding that Mr. Barrett had violated the following Rule of Professional Conduct on three occasions
identified as the Williams matter, Petersen matter and the California matter:
Violation of Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct)
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct), Rules of Professional Conduct, provides as follows:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud , deceit or misrepresentation.
Further, the above Findings and Conclusions are referred to and incorporated herein, with the
Court now amend ing the signed fi ndings by moving paragraph Nos. 33 and 52 from the section of
stipulated findings to the section on additional findings of fact from trial by this reference.
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DISCIPLINE
Based upon Mr. Barrett's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, a Sanctions Hearing
was held on March 2, 2015. After hearing evidence and argument, the Court finds and concludes as
follows:
1.

Mr. Barrett violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as outlined in the Findings and
Conclusions.

2.

Mr. Barrett violated the Rules of Professional Conduct knowingly and intentionally.

3.

Mr. Barrett's conduct caused actual injury but the injured party has been made whole.

4.

The Court finds the following aggravating circumstances:
a.

Dishonest or selfish motive;

b. Multiple offenses;
c.
5.

Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct.

The Court finds the following mitigating circumstances:
a. Absence ofa prior record;
b. Restitution and efforts to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved;
c. Cooperation with the OPC throughout the proceedings;
d. A partial understanding of actions he should have taken with his firm to avoid the
problems.

6.

The Court does not find that client funds were taken and that disbarment is not mandated
in this case.
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ORDER

Based upon all of the factors above and based upon the Stand_ards for Imposing Lawyer
Discipline, the Court finds that a suspension from the practice of law for a period of time
is the appropriate sanction for Mr. Barrett's misconduct.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that Joseph Barrett shall be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 150 days effective 30 days from the date of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Barrett shall comply with all requirements of Rule 14-526(a)
of the Ru les of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Barrett shall pay costs incurred by the OPC in prosecuting this
action.

Dated this 3rd day of March, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed/emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of

Suspension, to the following, this 3rd day of March, 2015:
Todd Wahlquist
Deputy Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
opcfiling@utahbar.org
George M. Haley
J. Andrew Sjoblom
Attorneys for Respondent
222 S. Main Street, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
GMHaley@hollandhart.com
JASjoblom@hollandhart.com

Addendum Exhibit 3

Article 6. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Rule 14-601. Definitions.
As used in this article:
(a) "complainant" means the person who files .an informal complaint or the OPC when
the OPC determines to open an investigation based on information it has received ;
(b) "formal complaint" means a complaint filed in the district court alleging misconduct
by a lawyer or seeking the transfer of a lawyer to disability status;
(c) "informal complaint" means any written , notarized allegation of misconduct by or
incapacity of a lawyer;
(d) "injury" means harm to a client, the public, the legal system , or the profession which
results from a lawyer's misconduct. The level of injury can range from "serious" injury to
"little or no" injury; a reference to "injury" alone indicates any level of injury greater than
"little or no" injury;
·
(e) "intent" means the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result;
(f) "knowledge" means the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result;

(g) "negligence" means the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation;
(h) "potential injury" means the harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the
profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and
which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the
lawyer's misconduct;
(i) "respondent" means a lawyer subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court against whom an informal or formal complaint has been filed; and

U) "Rules of Professional Conduct" means the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
(including the accompanying comments) initially adopted by the Supreme Court in 1988,
as amended from time to time.
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Rule 14-602. Purpose and nature of sanctions.
(a) Summary. This article is based on the Black Letter Rules contained in the Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions prepared by the American Bar Association's Center for
Professional Responsibility. They have been substantially revised by the Supreme
Court. Notably, ABA Standards 4 through 8 have been reduced into a single Rule 14605.
· (b) Purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings. The purpose of imposing lawyer sanctions
is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those
who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers, and to protect
the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have demonstrated by
their conduct that they are unable or likely to be unable to discharge properly their
professional responsibilities.
(c) Public nature of lawyer discipline proceedings. Ultimate disposition of lawyer
discipline shall be public in cases of disbarment, suspension, and reprimand, and
nonpublic in cases of admonition.
(d) Purpose of these rules. These rules are designed for use in imposing a sanction or
sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal profession has violated a
provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Descriptions in these rules of
substantive disciplinary offenses are not intended to create grounds for determining
culpability independent of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The rules constitute a
system for determining sanctions, permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning
sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote:
(d)(1) consideration of all factors relevant to _imposing the appropriate level of sanction
in an individual case;
(d)(2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light of the stated goals
of lawyer discipline; and
(d)(3) consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar
offenses within and among jurisdictions.
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Rule 14-603. Sanctions.
(a) Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or
acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct.
(b) Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's status as a lawyer. A lawyer who
has been disbarred may be readmitted as provided in Rule 14-525.
(c) Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a
specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be imposed for a
specific period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the
time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three years .
(c)(1) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less may be reinstated as
set forth in Rule 14-524.
(c)(2) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six months may be reinstated
as set forth in Rule 14-525.
(d) Interim suspension . Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a lawyer
from the practice of law. Interim suspension may be imposed as set forth in Rules 14518 and 14-519.
(e) Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer
improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice.

(f) Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which declares the conduct of the
lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice.
(g) Probation . Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under
specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in
conjunction with other sanctions , and can be imposed as a condition of readmission or
reinstatement.
(h) Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with discipline pending is a form of
public discipline which allows a respondent to resign from the practice of law while
either an informal or formal complaint is pending against the respondent. Resignation
with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in Rule 14-521.
r

(i) Other sanctions and remedies . Other sanctions and remedies which may be imposed
include:
(i)(1) restitution;
(i)(2) assessment of costs;
(i)(3) limitation upon practice ;
(i)(4) appointment of a receiver;
(i)(5) a requirement that the lawyer take the Bar Examination or professional
responsibility examination; and

(i)(6) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses.

U) Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary sanction
on a lawyer who has been disciplined in another court, another jurisdiction, or a
regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction.
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Rule 14-605. Imposition of sanctions.
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out
in Rule 14-604, the following sanctions are generally appropriate.
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e),
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or
another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a
party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious
interference with a legal proceeding; or
(a)(2) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes
intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or
importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt
or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or
(a)(3) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice
law.
(b) Suspension. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(b)(1) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d),' (e),
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential injury to a
party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or potential interference
with a legal proceeding; or
(b)(2) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in Rule 14605(a)(2) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice
law.
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e),
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury to a party, the public, or
the legal system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding; or
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d) , (e),
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes little or no injury to a party, the
public, or the legal system or interference with a legal proceeding , but exposes a party,
the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes potential interference with a
legal proceeding; or

(d)(2) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise identified in this rule that
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
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Rule 14-607. Aggravation and mitigation.

After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may
be considered and weighed in deciding what sanction to impose.
(a) Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify an increas.e in the degree of discipline to be imposed.
Aggravating circumstances may include:
(a)(1) prior record of discipline;
(a)(2) dishonest or selfish motive;
(a)(3) a pattern of misconduct;
(a)(4) multiple offenses;
(a)(5) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with
rules or orders of the disciplinary authority;
(a)(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices
during the disciplinary process;
(a)(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, either to
the client or to the disciplinary authority;
(a)(8) vulnerability of victim;
(a)(9) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(a)(10) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the
misconduct involved ; and
(a)(11) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled substances.
(b) Mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors
that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed . Mitigating
circumstances may include:
(b)( 1) absence of a prior record of discipline;
(b)(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(b)(3) personal or emotional problems;
(b)(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the
misconduct involved ;
(b)(5) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(b)(6) inexperience in the practice of law;
(b)(7) good character or reputation;

(b)(B) physical disability;
(b)(9) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
(b)(9)(A) the respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and
(b)(9)(B) the substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the
misconduct; and
(b)(9)(C) the respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability is
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and
(b)(9)(D) the recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that misconduct is
unlikely;
·
(b)(10) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the respondent did
not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the respondent has
demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay;
(b)(11) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or impairment;
(b)(12) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(b)(13) remorse; and
(b)(14) remoteness of prior offenses.
(c) Other circumstances. The following circumstances should not be considered as
either aggravating or mitigating:
(c)(1) forced or compelled restitution;
(c)(2) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(c)(3) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(c)(4) complainant's recommendation as to sanction ; and
(c)(5) failure of injured client to complain.
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Rule 8.4. Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or
official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law; or
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of
applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.
Comment
I1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct or knowingly assist or induce another to do so
through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so
on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from
advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.
I1 a] A violation of paragraph (a) based solely on the lawyer's violation of
another Rule of Professional Conduct shall not be charged as a separate
violation. However, this rule defines professional misconduct as a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct as the term professional misconduct is used in the
Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, including the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. In this respect, if a lawyer violates any of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, the appropriate discipline may be imposed pursuant to
Rule 14-605.
[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law,
such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income
tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication.
Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral
turpitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some
matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses,
that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a
lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be
professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those
characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty,
breach of trust or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that
category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when
considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests
by words or conduct bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates

paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph
(d). A trial judge's fintjing that peremptory challenges were exercised on a
discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule.
[3a] The Standards of Professionalism and Civility approved by the Utah
Supreme Court are intended to improve the administration of justice. An
egregious violation or a pattern of repeated violations of the Standards of
Professionalism and Civility may support a finding that the lawyer has violated
paragraph (d).
[4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a
good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d)
concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application
of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.
[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond
those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability
to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of
private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer,
director or manager of a corporation or other organization .

